

Message Text

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO ALL NATO CAPITALS

INFO AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USDELMC

USCINCEUR

UNCLAS STATE 123235

E. O. 11652: N/ A

TAGS: MARR, NATO

SUBJECT: SCHLESINGER TESTIMONY OF 18 JUNE 1973

1. SECDEF NOMINEE JAMES R. SCHLESINGER APPEARED BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON 18 JUNE.

2. FOLLOWING EXCERPTS OF TESTIMONY ARE QUOTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION AND YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO MAKE THEM AVAILABLE TO INTERESTED ALLIED OFFICIALS.

QUOTE:

SENATOR SYMINGTON:

EVEN THOUGH THE STUDY IS INCONCLUSIVE, A LONG ARTICLE APPEARED IN THE WASHINGTON POST ON JUNE 7
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ENTITLED, " PENTAGON STUDY INSISTS THAT NATO CAN DEFEND ITSELF."

I DO NOT KNOW HOW OR WHEN THE RESULTS OF THIS OBVIOUSLY INCOMPLETE STUDY WAS RELEASED TO THE PRESS

WHEN AT THE SAME TIME THE REQUEST OF THIS COMMITTEE FOR A COPY OF IT WAS DENIED.

I WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR FINDING OUT ABOUT THIS AND LETTING ME KNOW.

DR. SCHLESINGER. YES, SIR.

SENATOR SYMINGTON. WITH THIS BACKGROUND, WE WOULD ASK THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS:

HAVE YOU BEEN BRIEFED ON THIS INCOMPLETE STUDY?

DR. SCHLESINGER. I HAVE NOT BEEN BRIEFED ON THE STUDY, SAVE FOR THE FACT THAT IN A CONVERSATION WITH ELLIOTT RICHARDSON HE SPENT PERHAPS FIVE MINUTES, PERHAPS TEN MINUTES DISCUSSING THE MATTER.

SENATOR SYMINGTON. MY NEXT QUESTION: DO YOU BELIEVE IT WISE FOR THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT TO UNDERTAKE STUDIES WHICH ARE INCOMPLETE IN NATURE AND WHICH WILL APPARENTLY ALWAYS BE INCOMPLETE, BECAUSE THEY ONLY ANALYSE ONE OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS TO DETERMINE THE OVERALL COMBAT CAPABILITIES OF BOTH THE WARSAW PACT AND ALLIED FORCES WHILE AT THE SAME TIME SAID, " STUDIES OMIT OTHER ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS WITHOUT WHICH A VALID CONCLUSION COULD NOT BE DRAWN."

DR. SCHLESINGER. I THINK IT WOULD BE OUR INTENTION, MR. CHAIRMAN, TO HAVE A COMPREHENSIVE STUDY THAT INTRODUCES ALL OF THE VARIABLES IN SUCH A PROBLEM, INCLUDING TACTICAL AIR AND LOGISTICS AS YOU HAVE MENTIONED. PRIOR TO THAT, OF COURSE, NO FINAL CONCLUSIONS COULD POSSIBLY BE DRAWN.

SENATOR SYMINGTON. THANK YOU, DOCTOR. THE PRESS ON JUNE 6 RECENTLY REPORTED ON YOUR MEETING WITH NATO ALLIED DEFENSE MINISTERS. THEY SAID YOU HAD DOWN PLAYED SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN CONTRADICTION TO THE OTHER INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS. IN THIS CONNECTION I WAS IN THE MIDDLE WEST OVER THE WEEKEND AND I SAW AN ARTICLE BY MR. C. L. SALSBUURY " DEBATE OVER TROOP PAY MAY DISRUPT NATO." AND THE FIRST PARAGRAPH READS: " BRUSSELS: NATO WAS THROWN IN A TIZZY BY A UNCLASSIFIED

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SPEECH MADE HERE LAST WEEK BY THE NEW UNITED STATES DEFENSE SECRETARY, JAMES SCHLESINGER. SCHLESINGER APPEARED DELIBERATELY TO PLAY DOWN SOVIET MILITARY CAPABILITIES IN DIRECT CONTRADICTION OF A REPORT SIMULTANEOUSLY DELIVERED BY THE ALLIANCE'S OWN INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS."

HAVE YOU SEEN THIS ARTICLE?

DR. SCHLESINGER. YES, SIR.

SENATOR SYMINGTON. WOULD YOU CARE TO COMMENT ON IT, AS I AM CONFIDENT THIS IS THE ARTICLE BEING REFERRED TO IN THE QUESTION.

-- DR. SCHLESINGER. I WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO COMMENT ON THIS AT WHATEVER LENGTH THE COMMITTEE WISHES

BECAUSE THE PROBLEM OF WESTERN DEFENSE IS THE CRITICAL PROBLEM IN TERMS OF TOTAL RESOURCES FACING THE UNITED STATES AND ALL MEMBERS OF THE NATO ALLIANCE.

AS A RESULT, I THINK, OF THE RIVETING OF OUR ATTENTION ON EVENTS AND PROBLEMS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, NOT ENOUGH PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN ASSURING DETERRENCE ACROSS THE SPECTRUM OF RISK IN THE EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT. I THINK WHAT THE NATO ALLIANCE SHOULD BE STRIVING FOR IS AN IMPRESSIVE CONVENTIONAL DETERRENCE IN ADDITION TO THE OTHER DETERRENCE THAT YOU MENTION, MR. CHAIRMAN; THAT WOULD GIVE PAUSE TO THE LEADERSHIP OF THE SOVIET PACT SHOULD THEY TURN TO ADVENTURESOMENESS.

THE COMMENTS I MADE AT NATO WERE CONSISTENT WITH OUR INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES, ALTHOUGH I THINK THERE IS SOME DIFFERENCE IN, SHALL I SAY, THE INTONATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES. BASICALLY ONE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT THE WARSAW PACT HAS A VERY POWERFUL FORCE STRUCTURE. SOVIET MILITARY SPENDING HAS OVER THE PAST YEARS INCREASED BY APPROXIMATELY FIVE PERCENT PER ANNUM. OBVIOUSLY THE SOVIETS ARE USING THIS HIGH LEVEL OF EXPENDITURE TO INCREASE THEIR FORCE CAPABILITIES.

THE QUESTION THAT YOU RAISED EARLIER WITH RESPECT TO MR. RICHARDSON'S COMMENT THAT WE HAD UNDERESTIMATED THE CAPABILITIES OF THE NATO FORCES, I THINK THAT I WOULD BE INCLINED TO AGREE WITH
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THAT STATEMENT, MR. CHAIRMAN.

ANOTHER POINT WAS MADE ABOUT WHETHER NATO WAS OR WAS NOT ABLE TO WITHSTAND AN ALL- OUT ATTACK. I DO NOT THINK THAT WE CAN HAVE HIGH ENOUGH CONFIDENCE IN SUCH A CAPABILITY AT THE PRESENT TIME. WHAT IS CLEAR IS THAT THERE ARE QUALITATIVE PROBLEMS WITH REGARD TO THE FORCES OF THE NATO ALLIANCE -- PROBLEMS OF THE COHESION OF THE ALLIANCE, THE ABILITY OF THE ALLIANCE TO PERCEIVE WARNING SIGNALS AND TO TAKE COUNTERACTIONS, COMMAND AND CONTROL PROBLEMS, AND THE PROBLEM OF ADEQUATE INTEGRATION OF FORCES, ALL ALONG THE NATO FRONTIER. THESE ARE QUALITATIVE PROBLEMS THAT DEMAND EXAMINATION.
PROBLEMS THAT DEMAND EXAMINATION.

- I THINK THAT WHAT MR. RICHARDSON WAS ATTEMPTING TO SAY IN RESPONDING TO THAT QUESTION WAS THAT MANY OF THE BASIC INGREDIENTS FOR A STALWART CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY FOR THE NATO ALLIANCE HAVE BEEN PROVIDED, THAT THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL CAPABILITY THERE, AND WITH IMPROVEMENT AND STRENGTHENING IT WOULD PROVIDE US WITH THE ABILITY TO DETER ANY ADVERTURESOMENESS ON THE

PART OF THE SOVIET BLOC. I PERSONALLY BELIEVE THAT THAT SHOULD BE ONE OF THE ASPIRATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES IN CONCERT WITH ITS NATO PARTNERS TO PROVIDE A ROBUST CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY.

SENATOR SYMINGTON: BASED ON YOUR RECENT TRIP TO EUROPE, WHAT REDUCTION OF U. S. TROOPS WOULD YOU RECOMMEND?

DR. SCHLESINGER. AT THIS STAGE, MR. CHAIRMAN, I WOULD RECOMMEND NO REDUCTION. I WOULD WANT TO UNDERSCORE THAT WE ARE PREPARING NOW FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS IN WHICH WE ARE CONSULTING WITH OUR ALLIES WITH RESPECT TO MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS IN EUROPE. IT SEEMS TO ME IT WOULD BE UNIQUE IN THE EXTREME AT THIS STAGE FOR THE UNITED STATES UNILATERALLY TO REDUCE ITS FORCES PRIOR TO THESE NEGOTIATIONS. IT WOULD SEEM TO ME THAT REDUCTION OF FORCES MAY COME AS RESULT OF THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE MBFR DISCUSSIONS, BUT THAT WOULD BE MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS.
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SENATOR SYMINGTON: MAY I SAY I AM SORRY, I DO NOT AGREE WITH YOU ON THIS. WE HAVE BEEN HEARING THE SAME LINE OF CONVERSATION ABOUT MUTUAL FORCES FOR 7 YEARS, TO MY CERTAIN KNOWLEDGE, AND PERHAPS MORE.

GENERAL MACARTHUR, WHO WAS NOT THE LEAST KNOWLEDGEABLE MAN OF MILITARY MATTERS, TOLD ME PERSONALLY THAT IN HIS OPINION FROM A CONVENTIONAL STAND-POINT IT WOULD BE NEITHER A TRIP WIRE OR SHIELD WITH US SUPPORTING OUR TROOPS ACROSS THE OCEANS AND THE -- POSSIBLE ENEMY SUPPORTING THEIR TROOPS ACROSS THE PLAINS OF NORTHERN PRUSSIA, IT WOULD BE A PARADE, THAT WAS HIS WORD, NOT MINE, TO THE ENGLISH CHANNEL. SINCE THAT TIME THE FRENCH HAVE LEFT NATO. WHEN I RAN THE BERLIN AIR LIFT YOU COULDN' T GET ALTITUDE OUT OF FRANKFORT BEFORE COMING OVER COMMUNIST TERRITORY AND WITH THE FRENCH NOT NOW BEHIND US IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR ME TO SEE HOW ARMIES COULD MANEUVER ON A CONVENTIONAL BASIS. IT IS FOR THAT REASON THAT EVERY SINCE PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, AND BEFORE THAT GENERAL EISENHOWER, IN CHARGE OF SHAPE, RECOMMENDED WE CUT DOWN TO A DIVISION IN 1963, I THOUGHT FROM EVERY STANDPOINT HIS RECOMMENDATION WAS SOUND. EVERY STANDPOINT HIS RECOMMENDATION WAS SOUND.

MY TIME IS UP. WOULD YOU CARE TO COMMENT.

DR. SCHLESINGER. MR. CHAIRMAN, I APPRECIATE AND VALUE YOUR COMMENTS ON THAT. I WOULD MAKE TWO OBSERVATIONS. FIRST, THAT THERE HAS BEEN A LONG HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE DEFENSE CONCEPTS OF THE ALLIANCE. AS YOU WILL RECALL, WHEN GENERAL NORSTAD WAS AT SHAPE, HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT A SIMPLE TRIP WIRE STRATEGY AND HELPED DEVELOP A CONVENTIONAL

CAPABILITY TO IMPOSE A " PAUSE" THAT WOULD REQUIRE BOTH SIDES CAREFULLY TO CONSIDER THE RESULTS BEFORE THEY HAD RECOURSE TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS. DURING THE EARLY 1960' S, SECRETARY MCNAMARA PUT CONSIDERABLE STRESS ON THIS, AND IN THE LATE 1960' S AND SPECIFICALLY IN 1967 THE STRATEGY OF NATO WAS CHANGED BY THE AGREEMENT OF ALL PARTNERS TO PROVIDE FOR FLEXIBLE RESPONSE.

THIS ADMINISTRATION AS HAD ITS TWO PREDECESSORS HAS STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE CONCEPT OF HAVING A RANGE OF UNCLASSIFIED

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DETERRENCE ACROSS A SPECTRUM OF RISK, AND I THINK IT IS HIGHLY DESIRABLE FOR US TO HAVE THAT.

ONE OF THE CHANGES THAT HAS COME ABOUT IN THIS LAST DECADE IS THAT THERE IS NO LONGER THE OVERWHELMING AND PREDOMINANT US STRATEGIC SUPERIORITY WHICH PROVIDED FOR A EASY LIFE FOR THE DEFENSE ANALYST, AS IT WERE, WITH REGARD TO THE PROBLEMS OF EUROPEAN DEFENSE. THE AGE OF APPROXIMATE NUCLEAR PARITY IS THE CENTRAL NEW FEATURE OF THE DEFENSE ENVIRONMENT.

SENATOR SYMINGTON. YOU ARE MAKING MY POINT, IT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED FOR A GREAT MANY YEARS AND NOTHING HAS BEEN DONE ABOUT IT AND THE DOLLAR CONTINUES TO DETERIORATE IN VALUE.

SENATOR THURMOND. DR. SCHLESINGER, DO YOU FEEL THAT GENERAL DEFENSE CUTBACKS IN THE COUNTRY, COUPLED WITH THE TREMENDOUS ESCALATION OF SOVIET ARMS, COULD THREATEN OUR MILITARY STATUS VIS- A- VIS THE SOVIETS WITHIN THE NEXT YEAR?

DR. SCHLESINGER. WITHIN THE NEXT YEAR, NO, SENATOR THURMOND. I THINK AS INDICATED EARLIER WE MUST BE WARY. WHAT WE OBSERVE WITH REGARD TO THE SOVIET UNION, PARTICULARLY ON THE STRATEGIC SIDE, IS AN AGGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM WITH REGARD TO THE PROVISION OF NEW HARDWARE. NOW, IT WILL BE YEARS BEFORE DEVELOPMENT IS COMPLETE, PROCUREMENT CAN BEGIN, DEPLOYMENT IS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED, SO THAT I THINK THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY -- AND I UNDERSCORE THAT IT IS ONLY A POSSIBILITY -- OF A SHIFT IN THE OVERALL STRATEGIC BALANCE IN THE COURSE OF, SAY, 7, 8, 10 YEARS. I WOULD NOT ANTICIPATE, HOWEVER, ANY NEAR- TERM TROUBLES WITH REGARD TO THE STRATEGIC BALANCE.

ON THE GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES SIDE, I THINK THAT I WOULD REITERATE THE COMMENTS I MADE IN RESPONSE TO THE CHAIRMAN' S QUESTIONS, NAMELY THAT OUR CONVENTIONAL FORCES WITHIN NATO HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL CAPABILITY. THEY HAVE QUALITATIVE AND IN SOME RESPECTS CERTAIN QUANTITATIVE DEFICIENCIES WHICH

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WE SHOULD EARNESTLY ENDEAVOR AS AN ALLIANCE TO ELIMINATE, AND WITH SOME STRENGTHENING AND IMPROVEMENT OF THESE FORCES I THINK WE WILL CONTINUE TO HAVE AN AMPLE DETERRENT AGAINST ADVENTURING BY THE WARSAW PACT.

SENATOR THURMOND. DR. SCHLESINGER, ARE YOU WILLING AT THIS TIME, ARE YOU AT THIS TIME IN A POSITION TO STATE WHETHER YOU FEEL THE THREAT WILL INCREASE OR DIMINISH IN THE NEXT FEW YEARS?

DR. SCHLESINGER. THE THREAT IN THE SENSE OF THE WARSAW PACT MILITARY POSTURE, AND IN THE SENSE OF THE IMPROVEMENTS OF THE CHINESE STRATEGIC PROGRAM, WILL INCREASE IN ALL PROBABILITY AS A RESULT OF A CONTINUATION OF EXPANDED SPENDING BY THE PACT. WHETHER THIS RESULTS IN AN INCREASE IN THE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ALLIES DEPENDS, OF COURSE, ON WHAT WE DO, AND IT ALSO DEPENDS UPON THE EFFECTIVENESS WITH WHICH THE WARSAW PACT UTILIZES THE ADDITIONAL RESOURCES WHICH WE PRESUME WILL RESULT FROM THEIR INCREASED SPENDING.

SO IN A GENERAL WAY WE MUST BE WARY BECAUSE THE THREAT MAY RISE AND WE MUST BE PREPARED TO TAKE COUNTERMEASURES SO THAT THE MILITARY THREAT DOES NOT INCREASE AND, IF POSSIBLE, IS EVEN REDUCED IN TERMS OF AN OVERALL POLITICAL MILITARY THREAT.

SENATOR CANNON. THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.

DOCTOR, YOU SAID A FEW MOMENTS AGO THAT YOU WOULD BE OPPOSED TO ANY UNILATERAL REDUCTIONS OF TROOPS LEVELS IN EUROPE. LET ME ASK YOU IF YOU FEEL THAT THE US FORCE LEVELS IN EUROPE MUST REMAIN AT THEIR PRESENT LEVEL FOR AN INDEFINITE FUTURE PERIOD OR UNTIL AN AGREEMENT FOR A MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTION IS WORKED OUT?

DR. SCHLESINGER. I DO NOT NECESSARILY FEEL THAT, SENATOR CANNON. I BELIEVE THAT AT THIS STAGE THAT IT WOULD BE UNWISE, IN VIEW OF THE PENDING DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SOVIETS, WHICH WE ARE UNDERTAKING IN COOPERATION WITH OUR ALLIES, TO UNILATERALLY REDUCE THE SOVIET INCENTIVE TO NEGOTIATE BY OUR ACTION, AND AT THE SAME TIME TO DEAL A SEVERE BLOW TO THE NATO ALLIANCE. SO AT THIS TIME IT WOULD STRIKE

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ME AS UNWISE, BUT I WOULD NOT STATE THAT IN PERPETUITY.

SENATOR CANNON. WHAT DO YOU LOOK TO FROM THE STANDPOINT OF THE TIMEFRAME AT WHICH WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO TAKE ACTION OR IN WHICH WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO MAKE

SOME HEADWAY WITH RESPECT TO THE MBFR? ARE WE TALKING ABOUT A YEAR, ARE WE TALKING ABOUT TWO YEARS, TWO MONTHS, WHAT?

DR. SCHLESINGER. I THINK, AND THIS IS HAZARDING A GUESS, ONE IS RELUCTANT TO PUT MUCH STRESS ON GUESSES ABOUT THE PACE OF NEGOTIATIONS, BUT I THINK THAT ONE YEAR, TWO YEARS, ARE THE KIND OF NUMBERS THAT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE --

SENATOR CANNON. DO YOU THINK THAT IF WE TOOK A UNILATERAL ACTION ON OUR PART THIS MIGHT LEAD TO A UNILATERAL ACTION AS A FOLLOW-UP ON THE PART OF THE WARSAW PACT?

DR. SCHLESINGER. I DOUBT THAT INTENSELY; SENATOR.

SENATOR CANNON. DOES THAT IMPLY THAT YOU DON'T BELIEVE THEY ARE AS INTERESTED IN REDUCING THEIR TROOP LEVELS AS WE ARE?

DR. SCHLESINGER. THAT IS THE INFERENCE THAT CAN BE DRAWN FROM MY COMMENTS, SENATOR.

SENATOR CANNON. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THE 300,000- PLUS US FORCES THAT WE HAVE NOW ASSIGNED TO NATO ARE ASSIGNED PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF THEIR MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND THE DETERRENCE THAT THAT REPRESENTS, OR DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THEY ARE ASSIGNED PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS?

DR. SCHLESINGER. I THINK THAT IT IS BOTH, SENATOR.

WOULD YOU LIKE ME TO DEVELOP THAT?

SENATOR CANNON. WOULD YOU ELABORATE A LITTLE ON THAT?

DR. SCHLESINGER. THERE HAS BEEN MUCH COMMENTARY OVER THE YEARS THAT THE AMERICAN FORCES ARE IN EUROPE -- THAT THE SUBSTANTIAL CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES THAT WE MAINTAIN IN EUROPE -- ARE THERE MERELY TO PROVIDE A US PRESENCE, MERELY TO SERVE AS A HOSTAGE, AS IT WERE. WERE THIS TRUE, I DO NOT THINK THAT WE COULD JUSTIFY THAT LEVEL OF EXPENDITURES FOR SO UNCLASSIFIED

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NARROW A PURPOSE. IT WOULD SEEM TO ME THAT WHEN WE SPEND

AS MUCH AS WE SPEND FOR A CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY THAT

ALLIANCE, THAT THESE EXPENDITURES RETURN TRUE DEFENSE RESULTS RATHER THAN SIMPLY BEING A US PRESENCE. IT WOULD SEEM TO ME THAT A US PRESENCE, IF THAT IS WHAT IS DESIRED, COULD BE ACHIEVED ON A MUCH MORE INEXPENSIVE BASIS.

SENATOR CANNON. DOCTOR, RECOGNIZING THAT US FORCES IN EUROPE HAVE SIGNIFICANTLY DECREASED OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS, DO YOU BELIEVE THERE IS ANYTHING MAGIC ABOUT THE PRESENT LEVEL OF FORCES THERE THAT MAKES THEM CONSTITUTE AN IRREDUCEABLE MINIMUM?

DR. SCHLESINGER. I CANNOT SAY THAT. I THINK

THAT WHAT WE HAVE STRESSED IS THAT AS WE HAVE DROPPED BACK FROM FIVE DIVISIONS TO FOUR AND A- THIRD DIVISIONS IN EUROPE THAT WE HAVE LEFT THE EQUIPMENT OVERSEAS SO THAT WE CAN QUICKLY BRING THESE FORCES BACK INTO EUROPE SHOULD THAT BE NECESSARY. I THINK THAT THIS MAY BE ONE OF THESE TECHNIQUES THAT WE SHOULD CONSIDER IN THE YEARS AHEAD AS A POSSIBLE WAY OF DEALING WITH THE COST OF THE NATO PROBLEM.

I SHOULD STRESS AT THIS POINT, HOWEVER, THAT THE DOLLAR COSTS OF KEEPING FORCES IN EUROPE ARE VERY LITTLE HIGHER THAN THE DOLLAR COST OF KEEPING FORCES IN THE UNITED STATES. THE REAL IMPACT COMES ON THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS SIDE. SHIFTING FORCES FROM EUROPE TO THE UNITED STATES WILL NOT RESULT IN BUDGET SAVINGS ALTHOUGH IT WOULD RESULT IN A SUBSTANTIAL BALANCE OF PAYMENTS RELIEF.

WE ARE ENGAGED IN DISCUSSION WITH OUR ALLIES AS TO WAYS IN WHICH THE COST IMPACT OF THESE US FORCES STATIONED OVERSEAS FOR THE COMMON PURPOSES OF THE ALLIANCE MAY BE ADJUSTED PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE US DIFFICULTIES IN THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AREA.

SENATOR CANNON. IN LIGHT OF MR. BREZHNEV' S VISIT AND THE DISCUSSION TO BE UNDERTAKEN BETWEEN HE AND PRESIDENT NIXON AND THE MOVE TOWARD TRADE OPPORTUNITIES BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, DO YOU THINK UNCLASSIFIED

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THIS IS LIKELY TO LEAD TO A LESSENING OF TENSIONS AND, THEREFORE, PERMIT US TO REDUCE OUR MILITARY EFFORT MARKEDLY, ASSUMING THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS ARE SUCCESSFULLY CONCLUDED?

DR. SCHLESINGER. NO, SIR; I DO NOT BELIEVE WE SHOULD REDUCE OUR OWN MILITARY EFFERT EXCEPT IN

PACE WITH THE REDUCTION OF MILITARY EFFORT BY OUR POTENTIAL FOES. WE ARE DELIGHTED WITH THE ATMOSPHERE OF DETENTE BUT DETENTE REQUIRES A STRONG DEFENSE CAPABILITY TO SUSTAIN IT IN MY JUDGMENT.

WE GO BACK FOR ONE MOMENT TO THE QUESTION OF THE CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE, WHICH WAS DISCUSSED SOME MINUTES AGO, WE CANNOT BE IN A POSITION AS AN ALLIANCE IN WHICH WE ARE DEPENDENT, IN MY JUDGMENT, UPON THE SENSE OF SELF- RESTRAINT OR THE GENEROSITY OR THE GOOD WILL OF THE WARSAW PACT. WE SHOULD HAVE A DEFENSE CAPABILITY THAT DETERS THE WARSAW PACT. CONSEQUENTLY OUR DEFENSE FORCES, IN MY JUDGMENT, SHOULD BE BASED UPON THE CAPABILITIES OF OUR POTENTIAL OPPONENTS RATHER THAN THE ATMOSPHERE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, NOTWITHSTANDING THAT WE SO MUCH WELCOME THE IMPROVEMENT IN THAT ATMOSPHERE.

SENATOR BYRD. IN REGARD TO OUR NATO FORCES, I

ASSUME YOU WOULD AGREE THAT WE MUST MAINTAIN THE
6 TH FLEET IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AND MAINTAIN OUR
NAVAL BASES IN GREECE AND SPAIN?

DR. SCHLESINGER. YES, SIR. CERTAINLY FOR
THE YEARS IMMEDIATELY AHEAD. WHETHER THE COMPLETION OF
THE TRIDENT PROGRAM WOULD PERMIT US AT SOME POINT
IN THE FUTURE TO REDUCE OUR RELIANCE ON ROTA IS A
QUESTION ON WHICH ONCE AGAIN WE MUST RESERVE JUDGMENT.

SENATOR BYRD. THAT WOULD NOT BE FOR THE
IMMEDIATE FUTURE?

DR. SCHLESINGER. NO, SIR.

SENATOR BYRD. I WOULD ASSUME THAT YOU WOULD AGREE
THAT THE UNITED STATES MUST MAINTAIN ITS AIR BASES
IN ENGLAND, GERMANY, SPAIN AND TURKEY, THERE AGAIN
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SPEAKING OF THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE?

DR. SCHLESINGER. THAT IS A GENERAL OBSERVATION,
CERTAINLY, SIR.

SENATOR BYRD. IF THERE IS TO BE ANY REDUCTION IN
OUR NATO FORCES, IT WOULD HAVE TO COME FROM REDUCTION
IN THE NUMBER OF GROUND TROOPS NOW STATIONED IN
GERMANY. WOULD YOU FEEL THAT THERE COULD BE A
REDUCTION IN THESE GROUND FORCES?

DR. SCHLESINGER. THERE COULD BE A REDUCTION IN
THESE GROUND FORCES AS WE HAVE DISCUSSED EARLIER,
SENATOR BYRD, BUT I WOULD REGARD THAT AS UNWISE
POLICY AT THE PRESENT TIME. I THINK THAT UNILATERAL
REDUCTIONS WOULD DIMINISH THE INCENTIVES OF THE
WARSAW PACT TO NEGOTIATE. IT WOULD DEAL A
PSYCHOLOGICAL BLOW TO THE NATO ALLIANCE AT THIS TIME.
I THINK THAT IF WE STRIVED TO OBTAIN WITHDRAWAL OF,
SAY, US AND SOVIET FORCES ON AN EQUIVALENT BASIS,
AND THERE MAY BE SOME POSSIBILITY, SOME SUBSTANTIAL

POSSIBILITY, OF THIS, THAT THIS WILL RESULT IN A
REDUCTION OF OUR OVERSEAS PRESENCE AND A REDUCTION
OF THE BURDEN ON THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS WITHOUT
DISTURBING OR DESTABILIZING THE MILITARY BALANCE
BETWEEN US AND THE WARSAW PACT.

SENATOR SCOTT. DOCTOR, SOME MEMBER WAS TALKING
OR SEVERAL MEMBERS WERE TALKING ABOUT THE NUMBER
OF TROOPS IN EUROPE AND I THINK MOST MEMBERS OF THE
COMMITTEE DO HAVE SOME CONCERN ABOUT THIS, AND YOUR
THOUGHTS, AS I UNDERSTOOD THEM, WAS THAT AT THIS
TIME THERE SHOULD BE NO CHANGE IN OUR TROOPSL

I WONDER TO WHAT EXTENT IS THAT YOUR PERSONAL
OPINION, TO WHAT EXTENT IS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION
OPINION, BECAUSE WE HAVE HEARD THIS SAME THING FROM
THE VARIOUS WITNESSES THAT HAVE COME BEFORE US.
IS THIS THE ADMINISTRATION VIEW?

DR. SCHLESINGER. WELL, IT CERTAINLY IS THE

ADMINISTRATION VIEW, SENATOR SCOTT, AS A GENERAL PROPOSITION, FOR OVER 15 YEARS. I HAVE BEEN A STRONG PROPONANT OF AN EFFECTIVE CONVENTIONAL DETERRENT IN EUROPE PRIOR TO MY ASSOCIATION WITH THIS UNCLASSIFIED

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ADMINISTRATION. I CERTAINLY WAS A STRONG PROPONENT OF THAT DURING MY YEARS AT RAND AND BEFORE THAT. SO IT CERTAINLY IS AT LEAST A COINCIDENCE OF MY VIEWS AND THE ADMINISTRATION AND IT MAY BE MORE THAN A COINCIDENCE.

SENATOR SCOTT. AS WE ALL KNOW, EISENHOWER IS CREDITED WITH SAYING IT IS THE AMERICAN PRESENCE, NOT THE NUMBER OF TROOPS AND --

DR. SCHLESINGER. MAY I OBSERVE AT THAT POINT, SENATOR SCOTT, THAT WE HAVE HAD SOME CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL BALANCE SINCE GENERAL EISENHOWER MADE THAT OBSERVATION. WE ALL RECALL THAT BEFORE GENERAL EISENHOWER BECAME PRESIDENT HE WAS HEAD OF SHAPE AND THAT AT THAT TIME THERE WAS A PARAMONTCY OF AMERICAN MILITARY POWER. EVEN DURING HIS YEARS AS PRESIDENT WE HAD A DOMINANT CAPABILITY AGAINST THE SOVIETS AND IT WAS NOT UNTIL THE LATE 50 S OR EARLY 60 S THAT THERE WAS EVEN A FLEDGLING COUNTER- DETERRENT. IN 1965, APPROXIMATELY, WHEN THEY BEGAN TO DEPLOY THE SS-9 AND SS-11, THAT BALANCE BEGAN TO SHIFT AND IT BECAME CLEAR THAT WE WERE

COMING CLOSER TO AN ERA OF STRATEGIC PARITY. I THINK THAT GENERAL EISENHOWER, IF IT WERE POSSIBLE, SHOULD HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO JUDGE THE BALANCE AS IT EXISTS AT THE PRESENT TIME RATHER THAN THAT WE FOLLOW HIS DESIRE OF MORE THAN A DECADE AGO TO GO DOWN TO ONE DIVISION IN EUROPE. END QUOTE.

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